Tax notification at the tax domicile despite the designation of a representative: the TEAC qualifies the Spanish Supreme Court's doctrine under the rule of purpose achieved

The Central Economic-Administrative Tribunal (TEAC), in its decision of 25 March 2026 (First Chamber, claim no. 5861/2025, extraordinary appeal for unification of criterion), lays down a criterion on a procedural question that arises daily in disputes with the tax authorities. A notification made by the tax authorities at the taxpayer’s tax domicile in a procedure initiated ex officio is valid even where the taxpayer has appointed a representative with an address for notifications, provided the notification fulfils its purpose and has actually come to the addressee’s knowledge.

The legal framework combines several provisions whose interaction is not always read clearly.

Article 110.2 of the General Tax Act (LGT) governs where notifications are to be made in procedures initiated ex officio. It allows the authorities to notify, alternatively, at the tax domicile of the taxpayer or of his representative, at the workplace, at the place where the economic activity is carried on or at any other suitable place. The tax authorities have traditionally read the conjunction or —not and— as allowing them to choose among the places listed in the law.

Article 111 LGT, for its part, governs who may receive notifications. Where notification is made at the place designated for that purpose or at the tax domicile of the taxpayer or his representative, any person present at that place who states his identity may take delivery of it.

The facts are straightforward. Mr X was subject to a limited-scope tax inspection concerning his 2019 personal income tax. During the procedure he appointed a voluntary representative —Mr L— with an address for notifications on a different avenue from his tax domicile. After a record of non-conformity (acta de disconformidad) was signed, the tax agency (AEAT) notified the assessment on 21 May 2024 at Mr X’s tax domicile, where a family member signed the acknowledgement of receipt.

Mr X filed an application for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) on 22 June 2024 —one day after the one-month time limit counted from notification—. The AEAT declared it inadmissible as out of time, counting the period from 21 May. Mr X challenged that decision before the Regional Economic-Administrative Tribunal (TEAR) of Madrid on two grounds: that the notification was invalid because it had not been made at his representative’s address, and that he had only actually learned of the assessment on 24 May, when the family member handed him the documents.

The TEAR of Madrid partially upheld the claim, set aside the inadmissibility decision and ordered the proceedings to be resumed. It relied on the judgment of the High Court of Justice of Madrid of 10 May 2024 (judgment 329/2024, given in appeal 487/2022, which the TEAR cites as “Judgment 487/2022”), which had held that, once a representative with an address for notifications has been appointed, the authorities must notify at that address and not at the taxpayer’s, failing which the notification is invalid.

The Director of the AEAT’s Department of Financial and Tax Inspection brought an extraordinary appeal for unification of criterion against that decision. The Director’s argument relied on the Supreme Court’s earlier case law —in particular, its judgment of 7 October 2015 (cassation appeal 680/2014), under which, in procedures initiated ex officio, the authorities choose the place of notification without any order of priority— and on the TEAC’s own decision of 25 February 2016 (RG 5833/2015).

In the decision under comment, the TEAC partially upholds the AEAT’s appeal and lays down a criterion favourable to the authorities, albeit with a significant qualification. Its reasoning rests on three arguments.

First, the TEAC brings in the Supreme Court judgment of 1 July 2025 (cassation appeal 3905/2023), which post-dates the TEAR’s decision. That judgment held, as case-law doctrine, that in procedures initiated ex officio or at the request of a party “the tax authorities must make notifications through the appropriate or mandatory channel, at the address expressly designated by the taxpayer or his legal representative, above all where his right of defence depends on it”.

The TEAC qualifies that reading. The Supreme Court’s doctrine should not be detached from the facts of the case in which it was given: the Supreme Court found that, in that case, the taxpayer’s “right of defence had been impaired”. Where there is no such actual impairment of the right of defence, the answer may be different.

Second, the TEAC draws on the Supreme Court’s earlier case law on notifications that have achieved their purpose. The judgments of 5 and 26 May 2011 (cassation appeals 5671/2008 and 5423/2008) held that what the person concerned must prove is that the act did not reach him in time to respond to it. If he learned of the act, even through a third party, while there was still enough time to challenge it, he must do so. The time limit for a challenge does not run from the moment the third party physically hands over the notification.

Third, the TEAC relies on article 111 LGT, which expressly allows any person present at the taxpayer’s tax domicile who states his identity to take delivery of a notification. In that situation the law presumes that the notification will be passed on: the closeness shown by presence at the same address is enough to consider that the notification will reach the addressee and is deemed made to him, even if someone else physically receives it.

Applying this reasoning to the case, the TEAC concludes that the failure to notify at the representative’s address is a mere irregularity that does not invalidate the notification, since the notification fulfilled its purpose: the assessment actually came to the taxpayer’s knowledge in sufficient time to respond.

For the purposes of identifying the dies a quo of the time limit for a challenge, the relevant date is that of notification at the tax domicile —21 May 2024—, not the date on which the family member physically handed the documents to the taxpayer. On that criterion, the application for reconsideration filed on 22 June would have been out of time, although, as this is an appeal for unification of criterion, Mr X’s individual legal situation is unaffected (article 242.3 LGT): the TEAR decision in his favour stands.

The criterion laid down, with unifying effect, reads: “Since the validity of a notification ultimately depends on its having achieved its purpose, a notification of the decision concluding a procedure initiated ex officio made by the tax authorities at the taxpayer’s tax domicile is valid where any person present at that domicile who states his identity has taken delivery of it (art. 111 LGT), and the fact that notification was not attempted at the address of the representative appointed by the taxpayer does not necessarily entail the invalidity of the notification made”.

In our view, the TEAC’s doctrine offers a defensible technical reading, although it places the taxpayer in a more demanding position than the Supreme Court’s judgment of 1 July 2025. The key shifts from the place of notification to the taxpayer’s actual knowledge in time to act. That rule makes systemic sense —it prevents taxpayers from relying on formalities when they have had the opportunity to respond—, but it also leaves the authorities a margin of interpretation that taxpayers should guard against.

That said, in our view two caveats are worth noting.

First: the criterion itself says that notification to the taxpayer does not necessarily entail invalidity, which, as we read it, leaves room for it to give way where it is shown that the right of defence was impaired. If the taxpayer can show that the notification did not reach him in time to respond —because the third party was away, handed over the documents late, or the taxpayer was abroad—, the Supreme Court’s judgment of 1 July 2025 could be relied on before the contentious-administrative courts.

Second: the doctrine does not render the appointment of a representative meaningless. What the TEAC holds is that notification at the tax domicile is not, in these circumstances, void merely because a representative has been appointed. The appointment still has effects in the procedure —standing, communications, technical assistance— that should be preserved.

Some guidelines follow for taxpayers and their representatives.

The first is to organise the physical receipt of mail at the tax domicile where a representative has been appointed. If family members, employees or others at the tax domicile may take delivery of notifications as a matter of habit, the time limit may start to run without the taxpayer —or his adviser— learning of it promptly.

The second is to forward immediately to the representative any notification received at the tax domicile. A record of that transmission —email, internal messaging, a dated log— is the best evidence if an impairment of the right of defence later has to be argued.

The third is to consider electronic means. Mandatory electronic notification —where applicable— and alerts through the DEHú (the public administration’s single electronic notification address), sent to the taxpayer himself or to an authorised intermediary, make the trail much easier to follow and reduce the risk of a time limit running unnoticed.

In short, for the TEAC the appointment of a representative with an address for notifications does not automatically invalidate a notification made at the taxpayer’s tax domicile in a procedure initiated ex officio: if the notification fulfils its purpose —it actually comes to the taxpayer’s knowledge in time to act—, it is fully effective and the dies a quo of the time limit for a challenge runs from the date of notification, not from the physical hand-over by the third party.